

**SEVERAL REGIMES OF SEMIOTICS: G. DELEUZE'S
& F. GUATTARI'S RHETORICS OF AFFECTIONS**
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ABSTRACT: G. Deleuze and F. Guattari (D&G) are challenging and dangerous authors mostly because of their polysemiotic, cunning rhetoric. Main aim of this paper is to explore selected D&G's rhetorical and methodological strategies of analysis of various sign systems connected to the general semiotics that is based on the idea of specific "pragmatics". The aim of this text is to decompose some figurations of D&G's philosophical discourse through theoretical instruments of general semiotics, semiotic theory of reading and theoretical rhetoric with respect to D&G's consideration of affectivity.

Keywords: Gilles Deleuze; Félix Guattari; Umberto Eco; Charles Sanders Peirce; Ferdinand de Saussure; Louis Hjelmslev; Semiotics; Rhetoric; Affectivity; Linguistics;

The plane of non-writing? Rhetorics and figures of schizoanalysis

First problem every reader faces, when he/she tries to understand D&G is their *non-specific* rhetoric. This rhetoric is affecting and forcing readers to invent *specific* strategy every time when they read/struggle with these ornamentally-written texts. The main challenge is that D&G's rhetorical figures and persuasive nature of their arguments are not constructed in the regime of explanatory discourse and logically formal argumentation. Methodological/rhetorical figures are not based on any standard epistemology. Their rhetoric is analogical to their understanding of world, which is not (if one roughly reduce it) hierarchically built up structure (cf. the "tree"), but much more is the quasi-Nietzschean space of reacting intensities (cf. the "rhizome").

On the other hand is fruitless to mark their philosophy as a kind of shamanism or "pseudo-scientific charlatanry" as some authors did (Sokal, Bricmont 1998; cf. Derrida 2005). Gilles and/or Félix are constructing logic and poetic of its own, sometimes described as thought

of impossible possibility and possible impossibility,¹ which has nothing to do with formal academic discourse (cf. Deleuze, Guattari 1995, 7). The main challenge for the reader is that D&G are not *interpreting* concepts, but *using* them and often reversing (not only revising) their original or standardized meanings, like in the case of 'rhetorical figure' itself (as we will see later).

The second main problem which this text tries to decipher is this: when we speak about Deleuze and Guattari's *translation* or more precisely their *rhetorical deterritorialization and reterritorialization* of various traditional philosophical problems (e. g. as rationalization and reification) into semiotic terms (Holland 1996, 241), what do we mean by these 'semiotic terms'?

It is obvious that D&G are using some terms connected to various paradigms of semiotic (e. g. from C. S. Peirce, C. W. Morris and L. Hjelmslev), but reinvent/abuse them as the parts of their "revolutionary-historical-materialist-semiotic-psychiatry: schizoanalysis" (Holland 1996, 242-243; cf. Brown 2010, 111).

This reflection of their writing/s has one very trivial presupposition: persuasion of D&G's texts is in some way composed – although their philosophical language is difficult, in my point of view their language does not dismantles specific informal argumentative form or at least it does not abandons the effort to persuade a reader. Then less trivial question is: how or in what plane is the persuasive effect of D&G's writings constructed.

Initial (and not satisfying) answer could be that the main structure of their seductive rhetoric, which is infused with many rhetorical surprises, is based on the conception of specific (philosophical) affectivity transcending and transforming boundaries between standard regions of knowledge (e. g. of an 'artist,' 'philosopher,' or 'rhetorician').²

¹ „Deleuze's work everywhere marks this difficulty of thinking which leads back to its own unthought, to its impossible possibility, towards the gaping of its piecemeal fibres and agitated neurons. This is where the whiteness bursts forth like the call of a sign, of an event tearing everything under the lash of its furious whip” (Martin 1996, 27).

² Which we could see as a form of developing trend in philosophy/epistemology of transgression also present in other text of French philosophy of the second part of 20th century, e.g. in the works of G. Bataille, P. Klossowski or M. Blanchot and has its

Styles, figures and ornaments

We can provisionally call the plane where D&G's are constructing their persuasive effects as the double-bind rhetoric of immanence and immanent rhetoric that is (non)based on nomadic sign regime. As they stated: "[N]omadic waves or flows of deterritorialization go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching forth to the new" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987, 74). D&G are not using standard and basic rhetorical figures as metaphors (metonymies, similes or ironies etc.) in a common ('resident's') sense, i.e. as a kind of transcendental ornament exploring the original sense of reality but in quasi-Nietzschean (Deleuze 1996, 3) sense. I. e. as the specific figures that produce process of reality and the reality of process of possible interpretations:

There is no 'like' here, we are not saying 'like an electron, 'like an interaction,' etc. The plane of consistency is the abolition of all metaphor; all that consists in Real. These are electrons in person, veritable black holes, actual organites, authentic sign sequences. It's just that they have been uprooted from their strata, destratified, decoded, deterritorialized, and that is what makes their proximity and interpenetration in the plane of consistency possible. A silent dance. *The plane of consistency knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, or distances. It knows nothing of the difference between the artificial and the natural. It knows nothing of the distinction between contents and expressions, or that between forms and formed substances; these things exist only by means of and in relation to the strata.*

(Deleuze, Guattari, 1987, 69-70).

What are 'stylistic'³ correlations of the plane (of rhetoric) of Deleuze's and Guattari's writings? What stratifies their persuasion? As Jean Jacques Lecercle has shown, Deleuze's (and we can add Guattari's) rhetorical style:

various continuation till today (cf. Foust 2010). *You can never get rid of ants.*

³ If one know, that "[W]hat is called a style can be the most natural thing in the world" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987, 97).

- a) Is not the style of the "explorer of heights" but the style of "pottering artisan";
- b) Primacy for them is not the "system" but the "plane of immanence";
- c) The interpretation of other authors does not operates as "assertive and critical reading." Deleuze and Guattari are going beyond and inside the authors and reinventing their concepts, similarly to growing rhizome in the tree roots;
- d) Deleuze and Guattari are not "putting theses" but much more showing heterogeneous correlations;
- e) Their style is not classical but baroque (cf. Lecercle 2002, 56).

We can illustrate their strategy in the case of mentioned (rhetorical) 'figures,' which are definitely not connected *only* with technical rhetoric as the theory of proper speaking (*ars oratoria; bene dicendi scientia*). Definitely are not connected *only* with baroque rhetoric of affections (*Figurenlehre*) which deals 'mainly' with 'emotions,'⁴ i.e. figures are not the resemblance between musical *harmolody*⁵ and movements of the soul, as D&G have stated:

Figures have nothing to do with resemblance or rhetoric but are the condition under which the arts produce affects of stone and metal, of strings and wind, of line and color, on a plane of composition of a universe. Art and philosophy crosscut the chaos and confront it, but it is not the same sectional plane; it is not populated in the same way. In the one there is the constellation of a universe or affects and percepts; and in the other, constitutions of immanence or con-

⁴ It is important to say, that affects are not emotions, as B. Massumi (Massumi 1996, 221-222) stated, "an emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression that affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or recognizable, and is thus resistant to critique."

⁵ Term was coined by Ornette Coleman in the 1970s, see (Hamilton, Rush 2008, 24)

cepts. Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts.

(Deleuze, Guattari, 1994, 66)

We can see that 'figure' in the sense of D&G's point of view has its own ontological status as a general condition for generating affects. Figure is considered as something that aims beyond the art or creative process and beyond the situational affectivity, in other words beyond something as (rhetorical) 'figure.'

The second thing is that thinking does not belong only to the science and philosophy – we have to extend our thinking about thinking. If we try to understand what D&G wanted to say in this cryptic formulation, we can comprehend this perspective based on a figure of producing affects as an attempt to take the art (i.e. the poetic/creative processes) and philosophy 'seriously.' Seriousness is here articulated in counter-position to general idea of this word in philosophy. Art and creative process in general is not the medium of some intentional or, on the other hand, irrational action, which needs the Philosopher who explains to the artist and to the audience the reason of his/her work. D&G observed that it is important to take seriously the problem of affectivity, which can be articulated or more precisely sensible through art as an important part of philosophy or their original ontology. As they added: "[A]esthetic figures, and the style that creates them, have nothing to do with rhetoric. They are sensations: percepts and affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becomings" (Deleuze, Guattari 1994, 177).

This radical movement into the sphere of philosophical 'methodology' has nothing to do with any sort of mysticism, psychologism or irrationalism – we are facing the attempt to articulate radical and different perspective on traditional philosophical problems and also the attempt to invent different rhetoric constructed on different epistemological basis; rhetoric through which philosophy can speak and 'feel' about problems in different ways, not based mostly on binary schemes, invention of so called material-semiotic emphasizing the

actant-actor-net relations (Deleuze and Guattari are in Latour's bones⁶) over subject-object perspectives.

Texts, semiotics and desires of signs and objects

We would like to show here that one of many instruments they use for analysis of these planes of interconnection between explanation and intensity of creative process is semiotics.⁷ The first semiotic dictum of D&G's 'method' is that every concept is determined or conditioned by some sort of semiotic/rhetorical web (which is not the same as 'sociohistorical constructivism' based on structural linguistic/anthropological theories, which D&G refuses). Philosophical concepts are not speaking by neutral language (although they often desire it), i.e. "the rhetorical criterion in philosophy is undeniably sound and fury" (Descombes 1980, 3), as D&G noted:

First, concepts are and remain *signed*: Aristotle's substance, Descartes's *cogito*, Leibniz's monad, Kant's condition, Schelling's power, Bergson's duration [*durée*]. But also, some concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary, everyday word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms, shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a specifically philosophical athleticism. In each case there must be a strange necessity for these words and for their choice, like an element of style.

(Deleuze, Guattari 1994, 7-8)⁸

⁶ See (Iliadis 2013).

⁷ Cf. (Deleuze 1995, 143), (Charvát, Karfa 2016).

⁸ Cf. "The developmental or organizational principle does not appear in itself, in a direct relation with that which develops or is organized: There is a transcendent compositional principle that is not of the nature of sound, that is not "audible" by itself or for itself. This opens the way for all possible interpretations. Forms and their developments, and subjects and their formations, relate to a plan(e) that operates as a transcendent unity or hidden principle. The plan(e) can always be described, but as a part aside, as ungiven in that to which it gives rise. Is this not how even Balzac, even Proust, describe their work's plan(e) of organization or development, as though in a meta-language? Is not Stockhausen also obliged to describe the structure of his sound forms as existing 'alongside' them, since he is unable to make it audible? Life plan(e), music plan(e), writing plan(e), it's all the same: a plan(e) that cannot be given as such, that can only be inferred from the forms it develops

The *role of the reader* is then, in accordance to the part of their general 'program,' presented in *What is Philosophy?* Reader, despite various warnings from D&G,⁹ has to invent the conceptual (or rather semiotic) strategy (Which signs/symptoms of the text are important? Why these signs have these and these effects? Why these signs are outrageous?). Reader has to sketch (not draw) out the map - how to approach divergent ideas enciphered in language full of voluntary contradictions, excesses and humour (cf. Williams 2008, 14).

If we follow D&G's 'method,' one can try to prepare some space for "meeting of the intensities;" the space for exploring multiplicity of distances between readers and their texts. This attempt can be signified as typical ("tree-based") philosophical disease, fundamental neurosis of mankind known as *Interpretosis* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 127).

The situation of the interpret is very similar to the situation when someone tries 'to interpret' Cage's *Silence*, or in the field of philosophy to explore and 'explain' e.g. texts of late F. Nietzsche or novels of F. Kafka: firstly; readers are not facing the standard philosophical texts, they are facing speaking of silence, philosophical "poems" or the *Castles* (or the Dens), which have many entrances and many exits (Deleuze, Guattari 1986). We could glimpse the resemblance between these labyrinths/situations and texts of D&G in two ways.

'Something' as semiotic counterproof


First (a) resemblance with this *Castle* is methodological and was mentioned above - reader is facing the "constant betrayal" of the subversive rhetoric, bringing into reading "shocking" or even "barbarous" words.¹⁰ There

and the subjects it forms, since it is for these forms and these subjects" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987, 266).

⁹ Cf. "The present form is expressed thus: we have concepts! The Greeks, however, did not yet have them and contemplated them from afar, or sensed them: the difference between Platonic reminiscence and Cartesian innateness or the Kantian a priori derives from this" (Deleuze, Guattari 1994, 103).

¹⁰ This line was strongly developed in (Vitanza 1997); cf. (Lauer, Pender 2004, 106): "Vitanza explained that instead of consen-

is no 'authority of Author,'¹¹ no foundational binary opposition (e.g. between subject and object but also there is no foundational opposition of 'tree and rhizome') or standard logic of argumentation. We have to meet and take seriously the border-line images like Bussotti's musical calligraphy (which opens first plateau¹²):



The 'reader' (and there is no such thing as 'general reader' but necessarily the *signed* reader) is in the situation, that 'his abstract machine of reading' has to 'fabricate' his positions and concepts toward these divergent labyrinths. When we are considering anything from works of D&G we must face the fact, that they are distorting reader's pre-formed knowledge of many 'standard' philosophical concepts. D&G are often using mostly dangerous and not very common philosophi-

sus, Deleuze and Guattari focus on 'outsider thought,' 'nomad thought,' and 'schizo-dissensus'."

¹¹ "Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 3).

¹² "The score of *Piece Four* of Sylvano Bussotti's *Five Piano Pieces for David Tudor* is the most important image in *A Thousand Plateaus*. It serves as a prefatory image not only to the Rhizome plateau, but also to the work as a whole. It functions as the book's musical score, guiding readers in their performance of the text. Embracing John Cage's graphism and aleatory practices, Bussotti created his own 'aerial' new music [...]. The visual elements of *Piece Four* include a deterritorialization of the standard piano score, a diagram of the composition's abstract machine, and a drawing that Bussotti had produced ten years before writing *Five Piano Pieces for David Tudor*. The drawing itself is a rhizomic artwork, with details that echo visual motifs throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*. The superimposition of the drawing on the deterritorialized framework of the standard piano score conjoins the visible and the audible, faciality and the refrain, in a single artefact" (Bogue 2014, 470).

cal/rhetorical technique as humor, which can lead philosopher to certain death.¹³

But there is still 'something,' which affects the reader to fight with D&G's and reader's own concepts. What is this 'something?' We can analyze it from two perspectives: first (i) is processual: 'something' is *silent rhetorical dancing on the edge of the razor* – constant challenge to the reader to invent; texts of D&G are kind of a strong affirmation of the will to invent (not of the will to interpret, not of the will to knowledge, not of the will to power), desire to speak (or to write): "[P]hilosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1994, 2). Second perspective (ii) is semiotic in Peircean sense: D&G's texts are situated as objects, which affects their reader to produce specific semiosis. Which is, at the first glance, quite trivial.

We can develop this idea and borrow some thoughts from U. Eco's *Kant and the Platypus* from the chapter "1.1. Semiotics and the Something." Eco is dealing here with the question "What is that something that induces us to produce signs?" (Eco 2000, 12). As Eco noted:

Beyond a doubt the only person who made this problem the very foundation of his theory—semiotic, cognitive, and metaphysical all at the same time—was Peirce. A Dynamical Object drives us to produce a representamen, in a quasi-mind this produces an Immediate Object, which in turn is translatable into a potentially infinite series of interpretants and sometimes, through the habit formed in the course of the interpretative process, we come back to the Dynamical Object, and we make something of it.

(Eco 2000, 13).

D&G's rhetoric is sharing this perspective with Peircean semiotics considered in this way: on the first hand, text itself has to work as an object which is 'kicking' the reader, who is inventing potentially infinite series of interpretants and sometimes, through the habit formed in the course of the interpretative process, reader comes back to the Dynamical Object, but if we stress the Eco's

idea on the field of D&G's thoughts, these objects are not any 'things,' but generative, immanent processes. On the second hand, philosophy has to deal with this affective/pragmatic dimension of 'something' as the (non)base of philosophical thought.

This inherent ambiguity (of betraying reader and pointing on affectivity of the text and thought) is the advantage of their specific rhetoric, which is considering itself as non-specific.¹⁴ This rhetoric of suddenness, self-subversive, Cynical writing which often reminds arrogant anecdotes, is guided by leading principle that there is no leading principle: and if anyone argues that this is an evident self-refuting paradox - let's distract (kick) him/her with disruptive (shocking, barbarous) effect (with some "*sinsignum*"), e.g. with the humorous abstraction as a plucked fowl¹⁵ (shocking sign works as the 'antidote or counterproof'). Because "paradox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit. Humour is the art of surface, which is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights. The Sophists and Cynics had already made humour a philosophical weapon against Socratic irony [...]" (Deleuze 1990, 9).

If someone says, that D&G are misinterpreting Freud, Peirce, Saussure or Hjelmslev - D&G just say: So be it, you did not get our position. The trick is that we have no 'position,' we are just speaking from various positions and switching between them if it is necessary – or if it is not necessary, figure of our writing is not condition of the general law – our aim is to provoke thought, because we adopted the idea of potentially infinite series of interpretants and also the idea that objects, which are demarcated with them, are not structured things, but multiplying processes of creative intensities (and it has nothing to do with 'deconstruction'). Final and first message to the reader is: *act!*

D&G are not a 'paradigm,' they are not an 'example' – if we borrow vocabulary from T. Kuhn – they are not:

¹³ In the Nietzschean/Deleuzian point of view, the illustration is here the Plato's Socrates and his irony based on depth of metaphysical resentment. Cf. (Švantner 2015).

¹⁴ Cf. G. Lambert's/G. Deleuze conception of „non-philosophy“ (Lambert 2002).

¹⁵ See (Deleuze 1990, 135).

"normalized" scientists, one cannot write a textbook about them. And in as much they are inconsistent and ironical, they are in the same way inspiring (in affecting their readers). Philosophy based on these position creating 'something' (which is kicking reader to invent/act) as a disturbing blind or scrawled map similar to mentioned 'aesthetic figures.' Silent/screaming maps as J. Cage's 4'33'', S. Bussoti's "music sheet" or F. Kafka's *Castle* can be put in contrast to standard and strictly hierarchized and arranged of normative and normal(ized) knowledge – as the map of e.g. Parsonian system theory, structural linguistic, psychoanalysis or even standard scripture of F. Carulli's *Rondo*. These objects can show us some unseen paths and lines for various escapes: can show us seemingly natural linearity of the 'lines.' Like e.g. the *Treachery of the Images* or the gap between musical sheet and performance or sociological theory based on the form of Neoplatonism built on foundational differences.¹⁶

Distance of the deciphering reader

Second (b) resemblance is 'figurative' (*metaleptic*) and is entangled with the first, perhaps as the symptom of the first case, because we can interpret through the instruments of semiotics once again. Reader is maintained in 'permanent distance' through the strategies that turns

¹⁶ "[...] feature of Parsons' development of sociological theory was the introduction of the pattern variables. These patterns refer to the structure of role-definitions which are claimed to confront action as a system of conflicting choices. To take one example which is central to Parsons, a doctor, while following a professional-ethical code in the examination of a child, treats the child in a universalistic, neutral, and specific fashion. The doctor is, in principle, indifferent to the child's particular social characteristics (lower class, white, Catholic), because the doctor is guided by a professional interest in the child's symptoms. The child's mother, by contrast, is characterized by her particularistic, emotional and diffuse relation to the child. Parsons wants therefore to indicate in terms of values and actions the very significant differences between the family and the professional situation. They exhibit very different pattern variables, which in fact are related to the famous distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, which were first systematically described by Tönnies (1912). The pattern variables are claimed to be universal and inescapable: they are affectivity v. affective neutrality; self v. collective orientation; universalism v. particularism; achievement v. ascription; specificity v. diffuseness." (Turner 1991, xxvi).

him not to the 'fixation of his belief' but to persist in the agonistic or even polemic situation. To the situation when one must ask and *act*.

We can see here, why some authors talk about D&G's version of pragmatism¹⁷ (and perhaps that is why the pragmatics is necessarily presupposed by syntactics and semantics¹⁸). This shift is possible when we adopt the Nietzsche's idea (which we can find in ancient rhetoric, as Lyotard noted¹⁹) that figurative (metaphorical or semiotic) side of language is not something that covers thought, but is its very source and base. This position is not some kind of language idealism or linguistics structuralism, but is much more close (if we stress this reflection) again to Peircean view, that language is a part of more general process of semiosis that incorporates speaking, acting and being.²⁰ In the perspective of D&G is semiosis process of becoming.

We can conclude that the cipher of D&G's philosophy is not leading us to deciphering chaos to universal order, like in the various forms of 'Platonism' where philosophy/dialectic is entrusted to 'decipher' the world of appearances and to find the ideal 'result' in perfect and eternal Being, which can bring up the idea of perfect philosophical language. Dialectic does not lead to the situation of enciphering/abolition of rhetoric. But it is important to say that there is no point in searching for foundational oppositions as universal/particular. In D&G's semiotic processualism the cipher leads to questioning/analyzing specific sign regimes/mixtures, which are facilitating and are facilitated through organi-

¹⁷ See (Bowden, Bignal, Patton 2015).

¹⁸ Cf. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 86; 101).

¹⁹ Cf. (Lyotard 1988, 25-26).

²⁰ D&G are often stigmatized by the mark of structuralism, poststructuralism, postmodernism or even post-linguistic - but they have almost nothing in common with semiology, which has guided early perspectives of all 'shamans of structuralism': M. Foucault in his historical epistemology, R. Barthes in analysis of culture and literature, J. Lacan in interpreting Freud and C. Lévi-Strauss in the anthropological method of research. I think, that the main problem is rooted in the history of French semiotics or to be more precise in French semiology and in neglecting Peircean tradition of semiotics in so called structuralism. It is not a coincidence that D&G are using more general conception of sign derived from C. S. Peirce, J. von Uexküll and in some specific way from hero whose be the one who could unified semiotics (at least in U. Eco's *Theory of Semiotics*) - L. Hjelmslev.

zations (diagrams), and thus allows ciphers to be deciphered.²¹

Deleuze and Guattari against semiology: Hjelmslevian and Peircean Primacy

We prepared the roots for rhizomatic (dis)connections, we prepared the space for meeting the intensities of semiotic conceptions of D&G, who brought new perspectives into the discourse of French philosophy and semiology of that time. The main shift lies in their adoption of some ideas from C. S. Peirce (or rather C. W. Morris),²² and re-invention of some ideas from Hjelmslev's glossematics (which can be considered as general semiotics).²³

D&G have adopted nonstandard (for given intellectual environment) intellectual toolbox: French philosophical discourse about semiotics at that time was mostly guided by semiology strongly derived from F. de Saussure and 'early' R. Barthes. In France Peirce and his general semiotic was known for a long time only through very fragmentary, and in many ways misinterpretative/creative, works of R. Jakobson and J. Derrida, and from some remarks we can find in E. Benveniste's works.^{24,25}

²¹ It is obvious, that this is Foucauldian or archaeological/genealogical reading of this problem. Cf. "It is perhaps characteristic of secret languages, slangs, jargons, professional languages, nursery rhymes, merchants' cries to stand out less for their lexical inventions or rhetorical figures than for the way in which they effect continuous variations of the common elements of language. They are chromatic languages, close to a musical notation. A secret language does not merely have a hidden cipher or code still operating by constants and forming a sub-system; it places the public language's system of variables in a state of variation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 97; 175).

²² We mean the conception of syntactics, semantics and pragmatics, which is not analogical to Peirce's ideas of speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric (methodeutic). Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 586.

²³ For analysis of fragments one can find in D&G see (Williams 2015), for interpretation Hjelmslev's glossematics as general semiotics see (Trabant 1981).

²⁴ Even today, when Peirce studies has advanced considerably since its earliest days, many nonsenses persists and Peirce still sometimes misinterpreted e. g. as the "inventor" of absurd antimetaphysical doctrine based on simple scheme of icon, index and symbol. For Peirce receptions in France see e. g. (Lizska 1993).

²⁵ We are still able to find many people, who think that is

C. S. Peirce

Of course that D&G were not the scholars we can mark as Peirceans. We can find in Peirce's texts many incompatible and contradictory ideas to D&G's perspective, as e.g. many aspects of Peirce's evolutionary metaphysics or the ideas on final and ultimate interpretants (cf. Short 2007, 57-58). We could even say that D&G are in many ways very far from his conception of meta-logic/semeiotic, sign classification and sign taxonomy, although Deleuze is using Peirce's categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness in *Cinema* books, and some distant ideas (sign as correlate of social convention, behaviour and acting²⁶) from Peirce's philosophy can be found in *Proust and Signs*.²⁷ As J. Williams has stated, "for Peirce, the practice of thought in relation to signs is not an apprenticeship but rather a technical art that I have defined as an art governed by a method and a set of techniques" (Williams 2014, 48). As we stated above, this Peirce's pursuing of method (in the case of Peirce consisting of pan-logical view of the universe²⁸) is not the way that D&G followed, because they built their own

enough to say magic word "semiotics", which means something vague about signs and significations and this is what semiotics is. Cf. e.g. Massumi and his unclear distinction between semiotic and semantic (Massumi 1996, 286).

²⁶ Cf. (Smith 1996, 31): "In Proust, these signs no longer simply indicate contrary sensible qualities, as in

Plato, but instead testify to a much more complicated network of implicated orders of signs: the frivolous signs of society life, the deceptive signs of love, the sensuous signs of the material world, and the essential signs of an, which will come to transform the others."

²⁷ Cf. (Lecerclé 2002, 82): "Deleuze, so he claims in various interviews, discovered linguistics through Guattari (and did not like it). It is interesting, therefore, to go back to his earlier works to see his prelinguistic concept of sign at work. We do not have to go very far. He is, after all, the author of a strong reading of Proust entitled *Proust et les signes*. The concept of sign used in this book claims to be derived from Proust himself, and has nothing to do with the Saussurean sign: Deleuze deals with Proust as he deals with philosophers he extracts a problem from his works, and formulates the problem in a concept. In a nutshell, the concept of sign thus produced is a concept of generalised, as opposed to strictly linguistic, signs. That there is more to signs than the strictly linguistic variety is obvious to anyone who has read Peirce, whom Deleuze relies on in his later theory of the 16 varieties of signs, expounded in his books on the cinema. Here, however, the developments, being directly inspired by Proust, are more idiosyncratic, although the attitude towards the multiplicity of sign-types is the same."

²⁸ Cf. (Hausman 1993).

cosmology on deterritorializing and reterritorializing Peirce's concepts.²⁹

On the other hand, D&G adopted two main points from Peirce:

a) Sign is not purely mental unit (connecting concept and the acoustic image) and we cannot subsume various forms of signs (e. g. signs produced by animals) under one underlying, human culture-centered system of structuralism. One reason is that this system, even if it looks like, is not abstract enough or is not general enough, but Peirce's classification and taxonomy is, because it incorporates the sphere of *acting* and also the sphere of *affectivity*. In other words: semiology and semeiotic are different regimes of signs.³⁰

b) Sign is determined or affected by its object and affecting its recipient: the sign, considered as the primary element of sensation, riots the soul, renders it perplexed, as if the encountered sign were the bearer of a problem (Smith 1996, 32). Sign-production, *semiosis*, is not belonging only to human, but also to other spheres of the universe (animals, plants, mushrooms, machines, etc.); this general production of signs based on coopera-

tion and confrontation of intensities, which can be considered as (quali)signs or can be represented as more complex (legi)signs, permeates universe.³¹ In D&G's methodology symptoms of this universal semiosis of intensities are "refrains" (*ritournelles*), which structure the affectivity with respect to given organization. As W. Smith described this process in post-Kantian (i. e. Peircean) fashion, "in empirical experience to be sure, we know only intensities or forms of energy that are already localized and distributed in extended space: intensity is inseparable from a process of extension that relates it to extended space and subordinates it to the qualities that fill space. But the corresponding tendency is no less true, since every extensity necessarily envelops or implicates within itself the intensity of which it is an effect. A 'sign', in its second aspect, is an intensity produced by the asymmetry of differential relations, whereas a 'quality' appears when an intensity reaches a given order or magnitude and these relations are organized in consciousness" (Smith 1996, 36).

Ferdinand de Saussure

Why D&G refuse semiology and Saussure's ideas and pick up some ideas from Peirce, Morris and Hjelmlev? First reason was political: Saussure was considered as founding father of various forms of structuralism, and D&G's 'reading' of Saussure is in debt to this tradition. Although for Saussure was not most important task to create general theory of all signs,³² in this point of view he was considered as the main scholar who brought the theory of signs in the center of humanities. Saussure was and often is interpreted³³ as the scholar who was not interested in signs which are motivated by some "external objects", because these objects makes no sense in

²⁹ Cf. (Vellodi 2014, 80): „For both Peirce and Deleuze the diagram is the agent of the construction of reality. But there are two distinct conceptions of reality implicated here. For Peirce - committed logician and practicing scientist - reality is that mode of being asserted by a true proposition, regardless of what any actual mind thinks of it; reality is logical truth, independent of the actual experience or thought that is subject to empirical or dogmatic error. For Deleuze, in contrast, reality is that mode of being of material existence, in contrast to (logical) possibility. Furthermore the Deleuzian project is oriented not towards an already existing reality, whether actual or conceived, but towards the construction of 'new' reality that does not exist yet. So whilst for Peirce the construction of reality entails the acquisition of logical truths through a process of refining thought (through diagrams), for Deleuze construction involves the production of a new reality (through diagrams). Whereas for Peirce the function of a diagram is to aid thought's process of approaching logical truth; for Deleuze, diagrammatic construction is not grounded on what can—according to present criteria—be deemed truthful, but rather is directed towards the production of new values "not inspired by truth" and beyond any established measure.“

³⁰ It is important to say that there was a tendency, and we can trace it in many contemporary works, consider Peirce as the scholar who only added "object" to the signifier and signified and has invented putative theory of icon, index and symbol, or as the inventor of unlimited semiosis which is completely wrong in the case of sign theory and very unprecise in the case of theory of semiosis.

³¹ Cf. (CP 5.448).

³² Most important task was to discover general principles of linguistics and in the center of Saussure's interest was naturally the linguistic sign. Undeveloped science, called semiology could provide meta-theoretical tool for analyzing language as the totality of semiological facts, but in the *Course* is the semiology still more 'predicted' than explained, see (CLG, 34).

³³ See e. g. (Klinkenberg 2001).

his formal analysis of system of language where the primer is the "systemic motivation" (Thibault 1997, 85). It is necessary to say that there is a gap between the wide French adoption of some Saussure's thought inherited in his *Course* and interpretation of Saussure in the field of general linguistics. We can find many 'philological' commentaries, which are not only repeating encyclopedically layered simplified mantras, but trying to understand Saussure's work in its complexity. E.g. Saussure was not completely blind to motivation of signs in language and social aspects of communication (whole *Course* can be read as the project of construction of socio-semiotic theory).³⁴ But it is also true that Saussure's partial neglecting of signs motivated by 'outer' objects is excluding non-language signs and can cause some philosophical problems (which were not much important for the linguist) in wider application of Saussure's theory in philosophy and other social sciences. D&G's criticism in *Anti-Oedipus* and in the plateau called "Linguistic postulates" opens some of these problems and makes them visible.

In Saussure's view a sign is (on the one side) purely formal analytical category and is articulated through the negative relation to other signs in given semiological structure. On the other side sign is the instrument for communication and precisely in this aspect its function and value is positive. Sign is the unit which structure is arbitrary³⁵ articulated dyadic relation of signifier and

signified (Saussure 1962, 26). If Saussure describes sign in its quasi-empirical function, then the sign is psychological and internal unit coined by community of language users: "[T]hat is, signs are arbitrary when they acquire the status of general types in a system of value-producing relations. Both phonologically and grammatically they are replicable across many different occasions of use. Sign types do not, therefore, have a one-off status. They are fully generic, both phonologically and grammatically" (Thibault 1997, 280). As Saussure clearly stated; the one part of the sign is not a spoken word but an acoustic image, or image of acoustic sound which is 'chosen' through given code of language to be conventionally connected to the second part, which is the concept. As we can see, it has nothing in common with Peirce's symbol, which is the sign "embodying the 'ratio,' or reason of the Object that has emanated from it" (CP 2. 230).

The analogical reduction led Saussure to distinguish between two analytical dimensions of language (*langage*) in general: distinguish between language/system/code (*langue*) and speech/realization of parts of this system (*parole*). The aim was to build pure principles of linguistics in most reductive and scientific way; language in general has countless manifestations. If we want to analyze it in some sensible and scientific way, we have to reduce the field we are exploring. We have to reduce *langage* to two analytical dimensions and also we have to reduce the method of linguistics and define it in contraposition to other traditions examining language itself. According to D&G these could be *linguistic postulates*, but are not as 'fascist' as they said.

D&G's main problem with linguistics is that for it there is no need to bring up some affectivity or object-

³⁴ As did (Thibault 1997).

³⁵ The sign, as an abstract type, is outside meaning-making, *in this sense*, it is unmotivated. "In this perspective, signs cannot be motivated by any appeal to criteria which lie outside the province of *langue* for the simple reason that an analytical abstraction *per se* does not have a context-specific meaning. Only actual, concrete uses of signs do. Nor can the individual, by an act of free will or free choice, motivate the systemic relationship between signifier and signified. If this were so, then it would introduce an individualistic principle of anarchy and irrationality into the mechanism of the language system. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would subvert the systemic basis of *langue*. Consequently, no meaning would be possible because there would be no socially shareable criteria for making meaning in and through acts of *parole*. The notion of arbitrariness means, then, that the relationship between signifier and signified is established by *systemic*, rather than naturalistic, criteria. This means that a given sign type is recognizable as a semiologically salient difference in a given language (or other semiological) system. A signifier which

makes a difference in this way has a regular, patterned relationship with its signified(s) (Thibault 1997, 278). Cf. (Saussure 1962, 101): "The word *arbitrary* also calls for comment. It must not give the idea that the signifier depends on the free choice of the speaking subject (we will see further below that it is not in the power of the individual to change anything in a sign once it is established in a linguistic group); we mean that it is *unmotivated*, that is, arbitrary in relation to the signified, with which it has no natural attachment in reality."

motivated signs, which are most important for Peirce (at least as Eco noted above). From Saussure's purely analytical view,³⁶ consideration of these signs simply does not make a sense in his formal system. From Saussure's perspective we cannot construct any scientific method or system based on analysis of e.g. onomatopoeic expressions.³⁷ If we borrow here pseudo-Peircean language (Peirce has never considered dyadic structure of type and token, but triadic structure of tone, type and token), we cannot build the *science* of language on *tokens*, but only on *types*.

But what about the *tone*? What about signs of quality, or if we stress this idea further, what about signs of affections? As Peirce wrote: "A mere presentment may be a sign. When the traditional blind man said he thought scarlet must be something like the sound of a trumpet, he had caught its blatancy very well; and the sound is certainly a presentment, whether the color is so or not. Some colors are called gay, others sad. The sentiment of tones is even more familiar; that is, tones are signs of visceral qualities of feeling" (CP 1. 313).


Structural linguistic is on one side 'omitting' these signs as something not important for formal analysis of language, but on the other side this exclusion brings problems if we want to consider this reading of Saussure's conception of sign as the base for any general semiotics. D&G are developing this line of criticism of formal analysis inherited in this fashion of interpretation of Saussure, but from another perspective. Firstly, they

³⁶ As (Thibault 1997, ch. 3) has shown we can find three views on system of language in Saussure: as a system of pure values, which is often taken as the main one, or at least most interpreted one; system of regular lexicogrammatical patterns; system of typical meaning making practices.

³⁷ Cf. (Saussure 1962: 102): "As for authentic onomatopoeia (those such as *glou-glou*, *tic-tac*, etc.), not only are they not very numerous, but their choice is already to some extent arbitrary, since they are only the approximate and already half conventional imitation of certain noises (compare the French *ouaoua* ['bow-wow'] and the German *wauwau*). Furthermore, once introduced into the language system, they are more or less entrained in the phonetic, morphological, etc. evolution which other words are subjected to (cf. *pigeon*, from the Latin vulgate *pipio*, itself derived from onomatopoeia): obvious proof that they have lost something of their initial character in order to take on that of the linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated."

see the problem in unacknowledged postulation of "coded gap": to favor the signifier over signified leads the structuralism to prefer static system (where the signified finds itself by nature subordinated to the signifier) over the generic process. The static structure thus overcodes the great 'game' of language, which is every time brought into the idea of the relation between the 'speaking machine' and the environment (with its intensities), and the concrete regime of signs, which is limiting the given language situation and also opening various lines of escape. Saussure is considered as the author of a conception where the figures are "defined as effects of the signifier itself; the formal elements of the signifier determined in relation to a phonic substance on which writing even confers a secret privilege" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983, 242). This is also the moment where D&G are switching from Saussure to Hjelmslev, because they consider his theory of sign free of dominance of signifier (and we will examine it later).

Let's get back to the main topic, to the question if we can trace some signs of theory of affectivity in Saussure's semiology. Only one place where we enter to the plane of affectivity is in the simple circle-process of communication – when someone hear some articulated sound, which can start a process of understanding and speaking (cf. Thibault 1997, 294³⁸).



Affectivity, as a passage between effects, is certain type of the effect, but for Saussure could be considered as secondary and not important for formal analysis.

³⁸ Cf. (Ibid., 337): "Acts of *parole* are, then, dually grounded in relation to (1) the phenomena of the world which are selectively contextualized as signified substance and (2) the bodily (kinetic) processes of phonation and gesticulation which are selectively contextualized as signifying substance. In the specifically linguistic sense, this may involve the use of deictics or indexicals to specify the relevance of particular entities, events and so on to the interaction, as well as particular bodily and affective states of the speaker-listener."

So, why was this theory marked by D&G as not abstract enough? We can sketch some answers:

- a) (Questionable) Exclusion of any language pragmatic and game processes of language.
- b) Incapacity to fully explain (pseudo/not strictly in Peircean sense) "indexical signs" (as we discussed in the excursus above about Peirce/Eco)
- c) Problem of dominance of signifier and problem of absolute and relative arbitrariness of the dyadic sign, which is redundant in 'double articulated' Hjelmslev's glossematic.

There are two other main problems concerning the method of linguistic structuralism described in "Linguistic Postulates." First problem is political again and is connected with notion of power: linguistic is not the set of neutral rules (neutral systems of signifiers), but the set of semiotic or more precisely "semiotic" orders forcing to listen. Important units for analysis are not phonemes, but short sentences, enouncements organizing life: *act*. "Ready?" 'Yes.' 'Go ahead.' Words are not tools, but we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes. A rule of grammar is a sign of power before it is a syntactical sign" (Deleuze, Guattari 1987, 76). For D&G language is a 'chain of semiosis' – which is articulated as a system leading from one enouncement to another one, also segmenting the individuals moving them from one verdict to another. The second problem, which is more interesting, is methodological. In the critical perspective of D&G linguistic structuralism is wrong when is considering itself as speaking from some neutral zone of language - i.e. discourse of linguistic is itself a set of orders, regime of signs among others and is 'wrong' (in the D&G's perspective of pure abstraction) when someone conceives language as a code and as the condition of possibility for all explanation, and enouncements as communication of information. However D&G detours to different field - to Morris' semiotics which has not much or nothing common with structuralism. D&G are mixing

C. W. Morris (and his reductive reading of C. S. Peirce) to criticize Saussure in very strange way – they are postulating or inscribing to linguistic ontological hierarchy, that every linguistic is going in direction from syntactics through semantics to pragmatics. It is not surprising that D&G reverse this order (Deleuze, Guattari 1987, 76).

In the defense of Saussure it is important to say, that he never fully distinguishes between social and individual plane: relation is more 'dialectical' or processual than D&G recognized. We can distinguish between language (*langue*) and speech (*parole*), because they are not essentially 'social' and 'individual' as D&G read it, they are general analytical categories – and there is not a paradox – there is praxis – after Saussure we can study the change in the grammar of German language in 19th century in our office same as we can study the language inside the community. On the other side, it is true that if we want to study language in community we can't subordinate it to prescribed code – but even Saussure was naive to think in this way.

Louis Hjelmslev

The second part of D&G's conception of 'general semiotics' contains the work of Louis Hjelmslev³⁹ from whom

³⁹ And his *Prolegomena to a theory of language* (Hjelmslev 1963). As D&G has pointed out: "Louis Hjelmslev's linguistics stands in profound opposition to the Saussurian and post-Saussurian undertaking. Because it abandons all privileged reference. Because it describes a pure field of algebraic immanence that no longer allows any surveillance on the part of a transcendent instance, even one that has withdrawn. Because within this field it sets in motion its flows of form and substance, content and expression. Because it substitutes the relationship of reciprocal precondition between expression and content for the relationship of subordination between signifier and signified. Because there no longer occurs a double articulation between two hierarchized levels of language, but between two convertible deterritorialized planes, constituted by the relation between the form of content and the form of expression. Because in this relation one reaches figures that are no longer effects of a signifier, but schizzes, points-signs, or flows-breaks that collapse the wall of the signifier, pass through, and continue on beyond. Because these signs have crossed a new threshold of deterritorialization. Because these figures have definitively lost the minimum conditions of identity that defined the elements of the signifier itself. Because in Hjelmslev's linguistics the order of the elements is secondary in relation to the axiomatic of flows and figures. Because the money model in the point-sign, or in the figure-break stripped of its identity,

Deleuze and Guattari borrowed many concepts and also ignored many of them. They 'reinvented' them in the way that has not much to do with Hjelmslev's original texts. First of all it is important to say that Hjelmslev's theory of sign has nothing in common with Peirce's semiotics, and D&G's ideas are not synthesizing these two authors but intentionally (ab)uses them. Hjelmslev in many ways developed and reinterpreted Saussure's ideas about general science of signs (*sémiologie*), which is not based only on structural, but also on immanent (and purely algebraic)⁴⁰ linguistics. Hjelmslev described this doctrine as glossematics and its main goal was to analyze main glossematic object, main sign system - language (*langue*). This 'language' Hjelmslev called "semiotic," and is analyzed through the scientific meta-sign-structure - "semiology."⁴¹

having now only a floating identity, tends to replace the model of the game. In short, Hjelmslev's very special position in linguistics, and the reactions he provokes, seem to be explained by the following: that he tends to fashion a purely immanent theory of language that shatters the double game of the voice-graphism domination; that causes form and substance, content and expression to flow according to the flows of desire; and that breaks these flows according to points-signs and figures schizzes. Far from being an overdetermination of structuralism and of its fondness for the signifier, Hjelmslev's linguistics implies the concerted destruction of the signifier, and constitutes a decoded theory of language about which one can also say—an ambiguous tribute—that it is the only linguistics adapted to the nature of both the capitalist and the schizophrenic flows: until now, the only modern - and not archaic - theory of language."

⁴⁰ Cf. (Hjelmslev 1963, 106): "The theoretician's main task is to determine by definition the structural principle of language, from which can be deduced a general calculus in the form of a typology whose categories are the individual languages, or rather the individual language types. All possibilities must here be foreseen, including those that are virtual in the world of experience, or remain without a 'natural' or 'actual' manifestation and (Trabant 1981, 96): "As a science of general sign structures, glossematics is a science of theoretical possibilities and not of manifest realities. Hjelmslev's view of glossematics as a type of algebra should be viewed in this way, for like algebra, glossematics is a discipline of possible theoretical constructs that do not have to be made manifest in particular substances" (Deleuze, Guattari 1983, 242-243).

⁴¹ Cf. (Trabant 1981, 106): "Hjelmslev relates substance analysis to the glossematic analysis of the pure forms of language and signs in a complicated way, namely via a third-level sign structure, the so-called *metasemiology*. Linguistics-glossematics as a scientific metalanguage, whose object-language is a sign system, is a *second-level* sign structure similar to the connotative sign. In contrast, however, to the connotative sign, in which the *expression-plane* is made up of signs (out of the substances or forms of the signs, or both), linguistics as a sign structure has a *content-plane* of signs, but only the *forms* of the signs, as the

This conception of semiotic is much different than in Peirce, where the semiotic is coenoscopic, general science about semiosis (cf. CP 1. 242; 1. 242). In Hjelmslev's conception the general "semiotic" is glossematic and its objects are various "semiotics". But it is important to say that Hjelmslev conception of general semiotic and "concrete" semiotic is not analogical to Peirce, where the semiosis is based on triadic structure of sign (and phaneroscopy) – i. e. where interpretants are becoming the objects of another signs, and objects of Peircean general semiotic (or semeiotic) could be also tokens and other phenomena, which falls in the sphere of *parole* (for Peirce is this strong borderline between system and its manifestations redundant, or treated from absolutely different perspective). If we use the pompous metaphor, then where Peirce is 'pansemiotic/pan-metalogic imperialist,' Hjelmslev's conception is in a specific way pan-linguistic. As we said above; D&G has no specific position and they are much more picking up ornaments and figures for their philosophical/rhetorical/semiotic 'anarchy.' Let's explore some Hjelmslev's key concepts which are resonating (in intentionally distorted way) through the D&G's plateaus.

Hjelmslev is following Saussure's model and he insists that the object of general science about signs is not the *parole* but the language system, and tends to present the central ideas of glossematics itself as the fulfillment of Saussure's intentions (Trabant 1981). D&G are refusing this difference between *langue* and *parole* present in postulates of linguistic and structuralism, but developing other idea which can find in Hjelmslev's work. It is the idea of the movement or extension from *faculté linguistique* to a *faculté sémiologique*, i.e. the


substances are by definition not a matter for linguistics. The scientific meta-sign-structure is called by Hjelmslev *semiology*." Cf. (Eco 1986, 4): "In order to make this point clear, one must distinguish between specific semiotics and general semiotics. I understand that this is a very crude distinction in comparison with more subtle classifications. I am thinking of Hjelmslev's proposal according to which there are a scientific semiotic and a nonscientific semiotic, both studied by a metasemiotic; a semiology as a metasemiotic studying a nonscientific semiotic, whose terminology is studied by a metasemiology. Since semiotics can be either denotative or connotative, there is also a meta (connotative) semiotic."

idea that the language is the general semiotic principle but not only as static structure based on binary oppositions, but as genetic structure with the multiplicity of relations (hierarchies, interdependences and intensities as the e. g. relation of linguistic structures to nonlinguistic structures). As J. Trabant noted:

“Saussure presented language as one particular sign system among many, and linguistics as one specific area within the proposed science of semiology. But he did not claim, as Hjelmslev does, that the linguistic language was only one manifestation of a very general langue. In the passage in the *Cours* [...] Saussure refers exclusively to the linguistic language. Saussure is still working here on the abstraction plane of species (linguistic) *langue*, and not on the higher level of semiotic structure in general. (...) The extension of the concept *langue* to mean specifically ‘semiotic structure’ is characteristic of Hjelmslev’s radical interpretation” (Trabant 1981, 91-92).


The second radical shift in Hjelmslev’s interpretation of Saussure is leaving aside the conception of sign considered as mental unit connecting acoustic image and concept (*signifié et signifiant*) in favor to the conception of sign considered as a function that subsumes “something” (Hjelmslev 1963, 57) from the planes of expression and content, every language then forms this matter in different ways, and imposes different limits (Trabant 1981, 96). In my point of view this postulate, despite the D&G’s reduction of this thesis, plays important role in general reflection on signs in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Where Hjelmslev interprets Saussure in a radical way, D&G radically ‘interpret’ Hjelmslev.

To understand why, we have to follow Saussure’s distinction between two formless substances of language, which Hjelmslev has developed. For Saussure the form of language consists of two planes, which are (i) the “amorphous mass” of our thoughts (content) and the (ii) “plastic matter” (*matiere plastique*) of sounds. Language (as a *langue*, code, “system/structure”) is forming these formless substances.



The important thing is that for Saussure language is *synthetic* form located between these two substances, but Hjelmslev pointed out on the importance of *differing* formation of these two planes, and expanded their range in the fashion of his general semiotic as two different planes, from which the sign-function is subsuming wide range of elements. The basic question for glossematic is how this function works. This differentiation leads Hjelmslev to following model of the sign, which includes “six major components: expression-purport, expression-substance (ES), expression-form (EF), content-form (CF), content-substance (CS), and content-purport. These can be represented in the following diagram (with the particular interdependences indicated by arrows): Expression-purport-ES→EF↔CF←S-Content-purport” (Trabant 1981, 99).

Or as Eco conceptualized (Eco 1986, 45):



This option includes another of Saussure’s maxims that the sole object of glossematics is the pure, non-substantial form. In fact Hjelmslev himself (1954) differentiates within the substances between a physical, a sociobiological, and a collective-appreciative level, whereby the physical level of the content-substance approximates to the reference, and the other two levels to different conceptions of meaning. In contrast, glos-

ematic content-form is only form. It is not 'meaning,' although constantly mistaken to be so: it is only the framework, the net, the constellation of differences. Whoever misunderstands this, misunderstands the real intention of glossematics, namely to be a discipline "that is independent of all substances concerned only with pure form" (Trabant 1981, 95). If Hjelmslev adopts this radical reading of Saussure (that true goal of glossematics is to study language as a pure form), then has to admit that the "study of substance is assigned to other, non-glossematic, that is to say non-linguistic, disciplines. Semantics, as the study of meaning-the study of content-substance is thereby excluded completely from linguistics-glossematics" (Trabant 1981, 95), i.e. "[a]ccording to Hjelmslev, semantics, which without any doubt is an aspect of linguistics, must be regarded as a non-linguistic discipline, since it studies substance. But if we regard glossematics as general semiotics, then the exclusion of semantics from glossematics (semiotics) becomes entirely logical and sensible, since a general theory of signs is not concerned with meaning within a particular 'language' or sign system, but rather with the formal structural laws that might govern the content of the sign in general" (Trabant 1981, 96).

Third main motive which Hjelmslev is sharing with Saussure, but develops it in his own framework, is the refusal of motivated signs or "iconicity." These forms of signs, which are in his view "single articulated," Hjelmslev calls "symbols". These signs have nothing to do with any form of so called conventionalism. These structures has in the expression plane and the content-plane same form, i.e. they are interpretable objects to which a content-substance can be assigned, but no content form that differs from the expression-form: "These interpretable entities serve in Hjelmslev's argument as a background against which the specific characteristics of the sign, namely the differing forms of the two separate planes, stand out particularly well. Signicity consists not only in the mere distinctiveness of the two planes of expression and content (in symbols too, ex-

pression can be differentiated from content), but in the different form of the two levels" (Trabant 1981, 99).

The question is which motives of this highly formal system inspired D&G. First answer is: none. The complicated system of Hjelmslev's glossematics cannot be completely translated to the conception of D&G's semiotics. From this perspective there is no space for any kind of "socio-semiotics" or "pragmatics" or "semantics", "since a general theory of signs is not concerned with meaning within a particular 'language' or sign system, but rather with the formal structural laws that might govern the content of the sign in general" (Trabant 1981, 95-96).

On the other side we can say that D&G perhaps follow or ab/use often neglected part of Hjelmslev's system, the line of escape from his extreme formalism which is his connotative semiotics, i.e. specific pragmatics. Despite Hjelmslev's exclusion of pragmatic dimension from immanent and general theory of signs, he was not blind to 'reality of language' as living process connected to the action of speakers and listeners. Hjelmslev himself often operates with differences which are 'pragmatically' determined: as the differences between nations, classes, regions, communicative situations and individuals – and we can add the communicative situations which are *affected* by these differences. This pragmatic dimension, which has no importance for formal system itself, has its meaning in the immanent quality of the sign. As J. Trabant emphasizes: "[T]his takes place on an additional *content-plane*, which vaults over the *denotative* sign to form the expression-plane of the *connotative* sign. As an expression of the connotative content can serve the substances or the forms, or the forms *and* substances of the denotative sign" (Trabant 1981, 100). The connotative sign is not some 'emotive meaning', or any kind of psychologism, but another general structure of forming and differentiating planes. The connotative sign itself saying something about the individual who is speaking, e.g. as various forms of sociolects and dialects, therefore the glossematic interest in the connotative sign is an interest in the *forms* of the connotative sign:

"In this extended concept of 'connotation' every sign participates as a matter of principle in several connotative semiotic structures. Now if the connotative structure is to be a sign, it must be built like a sign and must have the strata of a sign: expression-substance, expression-form, content-form, and content-substance. Above all, it must possess differently formed planes of expression and content, that is to say a connotative expression-form and a connotative content-form" (Trabant 1981, 101).

D&G are ignoring the project of glossematic and following some pragmatic consequences of Hjelmslev's thoughts – where Hjelmslev is excluding these studies from general theory of signs to the sphere of non-glossematic study of substance, D&G are reterritorializing them in the center of their semiotics!

Discussion: Affectivity and the Defense of Saussure

We can see then that at least many of critical points they articulated in the "Linguistic postulates" fit perfectly to Hjelmslev's perspective which is very close to Saussure. Hjelmslev in many ways developed general idea of algebraic conception of language which source can be found in the *Course of general linguistic*. The gap, D&G demarcated between Saussure and Hjelmslev, is unnecessarily too deep. Again, it would be foolish to mark Deleuze and Guattari as the authors who are developing some kind of algebraic and purely deductive structuralism in Hjelmslev fashion, but they again got some main points from this Danish linguist. Deleuze and Guattari developing Hjelmslev's 'critical nominalism' to the form of 'processual realism': there is nothing such as 'sign' as substance, unit or 'sensible being.' What we call sign is a function which subsuming under itself various elements from the plane of expression and from the plane of content. But this function is deterritorialized from the field of formal linguistic to much broader context of our everyday, empirical experience and experience itself at all. Sign as function is not a sensible being, nor even a purely qualitative being - and here we are getting to the

point, to the original synthesis of Hjelmslev and Peirce in D&G's philosophy. Sign/function is unifying elements or processes from two planes in various relations (like e. g. difference, interdependence, conjunction and disjunction), but to understand how signs works we have to step to the Peirce and say, that this subsumption is process of semiosis, i.e. sign is not formal relation but ontological relation affected through fermenting intensities.

General point is that these two concepts could lead D&G to their specific synthesis or assemblage of Peirce and Hjelmslev's positions. On one side there is Peirce semiotic and phaneroscopic influences (sign is relation, but also the perceptible 'place' of affective quality of intensities) and on the other Hjelmslev and his presupposed destruction or deconstruction of binary organized 'suburb of semiotics,' semiology and purely immanent perspective.

The specific theoretical synthesis is built on the presupposition that sign is:

- a) The relation inherent to given regime (we can say given 'structure' or 'organization,' but in the sense of Hjelmslev's conception of flowing structures which are not (only) binary organized; sign-function is subsuming different and deterritorialized planes in some specific order)⁴²
- b) Therefore is determined by its specific organization
- c) Therefore sign is something which is affected (by given situation/object)
- d) And affecting the recipient of the sign
- e) This process is not the matter of traditional rationalism, empiricism or Cartesian metaphysics, where

⁴² Cf. (Eco 2000, 38): „In that case the system would be, as Hjelmslev would have put it, monoplanar: operations carried out on the continuum of the universe, by digitally activating some of its states, would be at the same time "linguistic" operations that describe possible states of the continuum (activating states would be the same as "saying" that those states are possible).“

we can distinguish e. g. between subject and object, intention and act etc.

As we can see, the 'pragmatic' plane (of affectivity of *parole*), which was not interesting for structuralism is here inherited as the main part of semiotic theory, i.e. where structuralism was static, D&G conception of sign is purely genetic and also implicitly refusing the essential opposition between *langue* and *parole*. But the genesis is not based on one underlying system/structure but is producing and is produced by various, multiplying structures. We can illustrate this perspective of sign/affectivity, as N. Nesbit (Nesbit 2010, 174) did in his analysis of connections of Deleuze's conception of sounding bodies. Let's imagine the Jimi Hendrix at the Fillmore East with the Band of Gypsies and his 12-minute improvisation of "Machine Gun", which was the assemblage of Hendrix, his Stratocaster, and feedback from Marshall amplifier on full volume. The organization of this signifying event cannot be subsumed and analyzed through standard tools of semiology – signs are not produced through "human language centered communication" including some articulated intentional acts, but through the "indexical/iconical" intensity of the process, including sounding bodies as the body of the guitarist as well as the body of amplifier, and the body of screaming feedback.⁴³

Conclusion

The aim of this text was to explore selected figurations of D&G's (re)interpretation (or *rhetorical deterritorialization and reterritorialization*) of semiotic concepts with the specific notion on affectivity. We analyzed D&G's reactivation/refutation (Deleuze, Guattari 1994, 18) of

basic semiotic paradigms (Peirce, Saussure, Hjelmslev) with the notion on specific problem of affectivity and showed problems, which stems from D&G's reinventions of these paradigms. We described the D&G's concept of affectivity as the core of semiosis and tried to show why D&G prefer (quasi)Peircean and (quasi)Hjelmslevian concepts over (quasi)Saussure and show some misleading interpretation of structural linguistics. On the other side we showed how D&G has opened (through their rhetorical deterritorialization and reterritorialization of presented conceptions) lines of escape from various forms of structural semiologies and provided instruments for considering *stimulus* (cf. Groupe µ. 1992, 147) as the main point of departure for every semiotic theory on various levels (from the relation between reader and text to semiotic ontology and perhaps semiotic cosmology).

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⁴³ Cf. (Bogue 1996, 266): "Deleuze makes explicit the relation between music and forces, but of cinema and forces he says very little. At one point in *Cinema 2: L'image-remps* (1985) Deleuze offers a Nietzschean reading of the film of Orson Welles and there makes frequent use of the concepts of force and power, but for the most part his theory of cinema is framed in Bergsonian and Peircean language of 'images' and 'signs' that is relatively free of any reference to force."

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